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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, the central focus of international law has 
shifted from protecting only sovereign states to protecting individuals.1 Still, 
the worst imaginable human rights violations—genocides, ethnic cleansings, 
crimes against humanity, and systemic war crimes—occur with alarming fre-
quency.2 And the international response is often slow or ineffectual. 
The most recent development for addressing this problem is the “respon-
sibility to protect,” an idea that has received so much attention that it now goes 
 
 † Associate Dean for Academic Programming & Professor of Law, University of Michigan 
Law School. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the May 2013 SHARES Conference at the 
University of Amsterdam Law School and the American Society of International Law Human Rights 
Workshop at the University of California at Berkeley Law School. I thank the participants in those 
events, in addition to Kristen Boon, Jacob Cogan, Karen Knop, Vijay Padmanabhan, Beth Van Schaack, 
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 1. See, e.g., RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 9, 37 (2011); W. Michael Reisman, Sover-
eignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 872 (1990). 
 2. For evidence that these violations are the worst of the worst, see the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, art. 4, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; and U.N. Sec-
retary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 10(b), U.N. 
Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
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simply by R2P. Almost all heads of state have endorsed R2P.3 The U.N. Secre-
tary General has made R2P a top priority and issued multiple reports on the 
topic.4 The U.N. Security Council has recognized R2P in both thematic5 and 
case-specific resolutions.6 Civil society groups have invoked R2P to demand 
action in places like Libya and Syria.7 And the scholarly literature on R2P—in 
law, philosophy, and international relations—has mushroomed.8 
Yet for all this attention, R2P’s contribution to international law or to the 
ultimate goal of protecting people from atrocities is uncertain. R2P stands for 
two basic propositions.9 First, each state must protect its population from 
atrocities. This proposition is well established in international law,10 but expe-
rience demonstrates that states sometimes fail their own populations. R2P’s key 
innovation is its second proposition: that the broader international community 
should step in, when necessary, to help at-risk populations. Unlike the first 
proposition, the second is widely understood not to be legally operative.11 And 
 
 3. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 
16, 2005). 
 4. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention: 
Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/67/929–S/2013/399 (July 9, 2013); U.N. Secretary-General, 
Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
A/66/874–S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012); U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional 
Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
A/65/877–S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011); U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010); U.N. Sec-
retary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 2. 
 5. S.C. Res. 1894, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009) (regarding the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict); S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (same). 
 6. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) (Libya); S.C. Res. 
1706, ¶ 12(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) (Darfur). 
 7. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, Op-Ed, How to Ease Syrian Suffering, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/opinion/global/how-to-ease-syrian-suffering.html; Press Release, 
Amnesty Int’l USA, Blocking of Security Council Resolution on Syria a “Shocking Betrayal” Says Am-
nesty International (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/blocking-of-security-
council-resolution-on-syria-a-shocking-betrayal-says-amnesty-international; Libya: Benghazi Civilians 
Face Grave Risk, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/17/libya-
benghazi-civilians-face-grave-risk; Urgent Appeal to Stop Atrocities in Libya: Sent by 70 NGOs to the 
US, EU, and UN Watch, U.N. WATCH (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/ 
b.1289203/apps/s/content.asp?ct=9135143. 
 8. See, e.g., ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (2011); JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: WHO SHOULD INTERVENE? (2010); RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO 
PRACTICE (Julia Hoffmann & André Nollkaemper eds., 2012); GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
(peer-reviewed journal published on a quarterly basis); Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, On the 
Limits of Moral Hazard: The ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ Armed Conflict, and Mass Atrocities, 18 EUR. 
J. INT’L REL. 539 (2011); John F. Murphy, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Comes of Age? A Skeptic’s 
View, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413 (2012); Esther D. Reed, Responsibility to Protect and Milita-
rized Humanitarian Intervention: When and Why the Churches Failed to Discern Moral Hazard, 40 J. 
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 308 (2012); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging 
Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007). 
 9. See, e.g., INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ¶¶ 2.30-.31 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT]; 2005 World Summit Out-
come Document, supra note 3, ¶¶ 138-39; Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secre-
tary-General, supra note 2, ¶ 11. 
 10. See infra Section IV.A. 
 11. Gareth Evans & Ramesh Thakur, Correspondence, Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect, 37 INT’L SECURITY 199, 205 (2013) (“R2P argues for a political responsibility 
on the part of the international community to help populations at risk of atrocity and creates no new le-
gal obligation whatsoever.”); Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. 
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the extent to which it otherwise influences outside states is, at best, speculative 
and contested.12 
Part of R2P’s challenge is conceptual.13 The United Nations and almost 
all of the scholarly literature support a particular vision for R2P—of outside 
states banding together and doing everything possible to help at-risk popula-
tions. R2P is said to fall simultaneously on all outside states or to favor their 
collective action.14 As for what these states should do, the possibilities are al-
most endless. R2P emerged from the debate on humanitarian interventions and 
has always been associated with the use of force.15 A forcible intervention 
might be the only way to avert ongoing atrocities. But R2P has never been ex-
clusively about forcible interventions. Recently, the conversation about R2P 
within the United Nations has shifted to the varied non-forcible and proactive 
measures for trying to prevent atrocities from breaking out.16 Such measures 
include programs to build domestic institutions or alleviate internal tensions. In 
the end, then, the vision for R2P that dominates current thinking is incredibly 
diffuse and open-ended. 
This Article critiques that vision and offers an alternative. I argue that 
R2P should not posit an all-encompassing duty that falls, at once, on the entire 
international community. It should instead posit a bundle of more discrete du-
ties, and responsibility for each of these duties should attach to specific outside 
states at a time.17 In particular, an outside state should be responsible as a re-
 
INT’L L. 319, 338-39 (2012) (“[R2P] remains merely a concept, with no independent legal force . . . .”); 
Neomi Rao, The Choice to Protect: Rethinking Responsibility for Humanitarian Intervention, 44 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 697 (2013) (arguing that any R2P duty to foreign populations is new and 
that existing justifications for it are insufficient); Stahn, supra note 8, at 109 (describing R2P as an ex-
pression of “a voluntary, rather than a mandatory, engagement”). 
 12. Compare, e.g., Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Côte 
d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, 87 INT’L AFF. 825, 826 (2011) (arguing that R2P has 
helped shape a “‘new’ politics of protection” that might affect the response to particular crises), with 
Saira Mohamed, Shame in the Security Council, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1251 (2013) (doubting that 
“shaming based on the notion of a responsibility to protect yields productive results”), and David Rieff, 
Op-Ed., R2P, R.I.P, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-
rip.html (arguing that using R2P to justify regime change in Libya delegitimized the concept and dam-
aged its “prospects of becoming a global norm”). 
 13. See, e.g., Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On, 24 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 143, 144 (2010) (“[P]rofound disagreements persist about the function, meaning, and proper 
use of RtoP . . . .”); Hanne Cuyckens & Philip De Man, The Responsibility to Prevent: On the Assumed 
Legal Nature of Responsibility to Protect and its Relationship with Conflict Prevention, in 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 111 (“[A] conceptual 
entanglement . . . significantly compounds the practical operationalisation of the RtoP concept.”). 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See, e.g., ICISS REPORT, supra note 9, ¶¶ 2.24-.27; Interview by UN News Centre with 
Edward Luck, Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary-General (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=38 (“Many people think that responsibility to 
protect is all about the use of military force after the bodies start piling up.”). 
 16. See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 
2, ¶ 44; Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 
supra note 4, ¶¶ 30-64; see also Alex J. Bellamy, Making RtoP a Living Reality: Reflections on the 2012 
General Assembly Dialogue on Timely and Decisive Response, 5 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 109, 122 
(2013) (“[M]any Member States expressed their support for the Secretary-General’s view that the inter-
national community should focus on preventing [atrocities] thereby reducing the need for timely and 
decisive response.”). 
 17. Some philosophers have argued that a moral duty to intervene militarily can fall on specif-
ic outside states. Compare, e.g., PATTISON, supra note 8, at 36-38, 182 (arguing for assigning the duty 
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sult of its own conduct or relationships. This vision for R2P is preferable to the 
one that now dominates R2P thinking because this vision builds on existing in-
ternational law. International law has already begun to assign states duties for 
the benefit of foreign populations, and the trajectory is to continue expanding 
these duties.18 The duties are legally operative, however, only when responsi-
bility can be pinned on particular states at a time.19 
My goal in this Article is to offer a framework for refining the R2P 
idea—that is, for identifying when atrocities do or should trigger an outside 
state’s responsibility. Rooting this framework in international law, as opposed 
to in mere policy proposals, might be beneficial for two reasons. First, because 
international law has already begun to account for the interests that animate 
R2P, existing legal arrangements have descriptive and predictive value for R2P. 
They shed light both on the extent to which global actors already support R2P 
and on the prospects for success going forward. Second, tethering R2P to inter-
national law might make it more effective. International law might help broad-
en R2P’s base of support, influence the behavior of outside states, or legitimize 
efforts to hold particular outside states responsible.20 
Because I focus on legal duties, I do not address the right to use armed 
force for humanitarian purposes. Though outside states sometimes have that 
right,21 any duty to use armed force would be completely out of touch with 
 
primarily on the basis of each actor’s capacity to achieve good consequences), and Luke Glanville, On 
the Meaning of ‘Responsibility’ in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 482, 494-96 
(2011) (arguing that emergent norms assign the duty on the basis of a state’s capacity or historical ties to 
the population), with Kok-Chor Tan, The Duty to Protect, in NOMOS XLVII: HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 84, 102 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2006) (arguing that assigning the duty 
on the basis of capacity might impose “unreasonably heavy burdens on a country just because it is capa-
ble of action”). My vision builds on that philosophical argument but differs from it in two respects. First, 
I focus on legal, not moral, duties. Second, I focus on duties that do not involve the use of armed force. 
 18. See infra Section IV.A. 
 19. A note on terminology might be useful here. The R2P literature uses the word “responsi-
bility” to suggest some kind of moral or legal duty. In international law, “responsibility” usually means 
not the duty itself but the consequence of failing to satisfy a duty; a state that violates a duty is responsi-
ble for that violation. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
with Commentaries, arts. 1-2, in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 
10, 2001, ¶¶ 76-77, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility]; Alain Pellet, The Definition of Responsibility in International Law, in THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 8-9 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). I use “responsibil-
ity” in this latter sense. Nevertheless, I use “R2P” for the idea that states should protect at-risk popula-
tions. 
 20. An extensive literature now examines the mechanisms by which international law can in-
fluence states’ human rights practices. See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 357 (2009) (“[R]atified [human rights] treaties provide 
highly legitimate focal points that help to clarify reasonable demands, support the legitimacy of those 
demands, and contribute to the political and legal resources [domestic] stakeholders can bring to bear in 
the quest to realize treaty rights.”); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socializa-
tion and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (examining coercion, persuasion, 
and acculturation as three separate mechanisms for influencing states); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Ki-
yoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. 
SOC. 1373, 1402 (2005) (offering empirical evidence that “international civil society has been using the 
legitimacy of human rights [law] to pressure governments to improve human rights practices”). On the 
more basic point that law can shape attitudes or conduct, see Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theo-
ry of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2000); and Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Func-
tion of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
 21. Although international lawyers debate whether outside states may use force for humanitar-
ian ends in the absence of any authorization from the U.N. Security Council, states clearly have this 
2014] Toward a Legal Theory on the Responsibility to Protect  251 
  
current expectations. First, the duty would be extraordinarily onerous if it were 
assigned to only one or a small handful of states.22 Second, international law 
never requires—and is skittish even about permitting—cross-border violence.23 
Still, states might have to use other levers of power, like economic or diplomat-
ic measures, to help a foreign population. These other measures might be less 
effective than force at averting a particular crisis, but they also are less burden-
some for the acting state and less intrusive on the territorial state. As such, an 
outside state might realistically be expected to take these measures even if it 
would rather not. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly describes the emergence 
and development of R2P. Part III argues that framing R2P as a collective duty 
saps the idea of its legal potential. Part IV presents my alternative vision for 
R2P. I argue that international law already establishes a solid foundation for 
R2P. Human rights law and the law on state responsibility together provide the 
seeds both for defining discrete R2P duties and for distributing among outside 
states the associated responsibilities. After demonstrating that this foundation 
exists in international law, Part IV examines how global actors might build up-
on it to help satisfy R2P’s objectives. 
II. R2P’S PROMISE AND CHALLENGE 
R2P emerged from the international community’s broad sense of regret 
for the humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.24 These crises 
triggered an extensive debate among officials, practitioners, and scholars about 
how to improve the international response to atrocities. The debate initially fo-
cused on forcible humanitarian interventions.25 Such interventions are contro-
versial—many would say unlawful—without authorization from the U.N. Secu-
rity Council or consent from the territorial state.26 Yet the Kosovo crisis 
demonstrated that the Council might be paralyzed by a permanent member’s 
veto, even when the weight of opinion overwhelmingly favors a military inter-
 
right when they act pursuant to such authorization. See U.N. Charter ch. VII; 2005 World Summit Out-
come Document, supra note 3, ¶¶ 138–39. 
 22. Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States 
to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 300-01 (2013) (“Absent strong reciprocal commit-
ments and other institutional assurances, sovereigns are subject only to certain minimal obligations that 
do not impose substantial burdens on them and that may actually assist them in adopting optimal poli-
cies.”); Thomas Pogge, Moralizing Humanitarian Intervention: Why Jurying Fails and How Law Can 
Work, in NOMOS XLVII: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 17, at 158, 166-67 (discussing 
the unwillingness of states to commit resources for humanitarian interventions). 
 23. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; id. ch. VII. 
 24. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1.1-.4. 
 25. See, e.g., Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 
24 WIS. INT’L L. J. 703, 708 (2006) (describing the emergence of R2P in the aftermath of Kosovo). 
 26. See, e.g., Miguel d’Escoto Brockmaun, Statement at the Opening of the Thematic Dia-
logue of the General Assembly on the Responsibility to Protect (July 23, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/statements/openingr2p230709.shtml (reflecting developing states’ 
skepticism of unilateral humanitarian interventions); Albrecht Randelzhofer & Oliver Dörr, Article 2(4), 
in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 200, 223 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d 
ed. 2012) (“[T]here is no room for the concept of [unilateral] humanitarian intervention being deduced 
from the UN Charter . . . .”). 
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vention.27 Further, Rwanda demonstrated that states might lack the political 
will to intervene or, therefore, to seek the Council’s authorization.28 The early 
debate about improving the international response to atrocities thus struggled to 
overcome the practical impediments to a Council-authorized intervention. 
The logjam in that debate began to break in 2001, when an independent 
commission established by Canada (the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty or ICISS) published a report entitled The Responsi-
bility to Protect.29 The ICISS report made two key moves. First, instead of ad-
dressing the right of outside states to intervene militarily, the report declared a 
responsibility—something akin to a duty—to get involved.30 The report af-
firmatively encouraged states to try to protect foreign populations. Second, in-
stead of focusing only on military actions, the ICISS report endorsed a broad 
range of measures for protecting at-risk populations, including measures to tar-
get the root causes of atrocity.31 Forcible interventions were just a small piece 
of the R2P idea. 
A few years after the ICISS published its report, the U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral endorsed the R2P idea and then initiated a broader conversation about R2P 
within the United Nations.32  This conversation was, from the beginning, 
haunted by R2P’s association with humanitarian interventions. States refused to 
support a new right—and especially a new duty—to intervene militarily in hu-
manitarian crises.33 Thus, when almost all heads of state addressed R2P in 
their 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, they hedged on humanitarian 
interventions: “We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and deci-
sive manner, through the Security Council . . . on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations, as appropriate, should peace-
 
 27. See, e.g., INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOS., KOSOVO REPORT 140-42, 163-98 (2000) (exam-
ining the Kosovo incident). 
 28. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Dec. 15, 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, 43-44, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999) (explaining that 
one reason for the failure to stop the Rwandan genocide was a lack of political will to contribute troops 
to any Council-authorized operation); ALISON DES FORGES, “LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY”: 
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 644-46 (1999) (explaining that states were slow to contribute to the U.N. peace-
keeping operation in Rwanda, despite the evidence of genocide). 
 29. ICISS REPORT, supra note 9. 
 30. Id. ¶¶ 2.24-.33, at 15-18; see also ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 430 (2004) (explaining that, alt-
hough the report “stops short of declaring explicitly that there is an obligation to protect, it . . . clearly 
goes beyond the traditional assumption that at most intervention is permissible”); Louise Arbour, The 
Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice, 34 REV. INT’L STUD. 445, 
450 (2008) (“[States] have lost their ‘right’ to intervene, a discretionary prerogative, and willingly ac-
quired, instead, a responsibility for a failure to act, a failure for which, I suggest, they could be held ac-
countable.”). 
 31. ICISS REPORT, supra note 9, ¶¶ 3.1-.43, 4.1-.9. 
 32. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Rep. of the 
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶ 201, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 
(Dec. 2, 2004) (asserting that the debate should focus not on “the ‘right to intervene’ of any State but the 
‘responsibility to protect’ of every State”); U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards De-
velopment, Security, and Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 132, 135, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (expressing “strong[] agree[ment]” with ICISS’s approach and calling on the 
U.N. to “move towards embracing and acting on” R2P). 
 33. See Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of 
Force: Building Legality?, 2 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 191, 192 (2010) (describing the use of force as 
the most controversial aspect of R2P). 
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ful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to pro-
tect their populations . . . .”34 That formulation retreats from the ICISS report, 
which supports unauthorized humanitarian interventions when all other options 
for averting a crisis have been exhausted.35 Many have therefore criticized the 
World Summit Outcome Document for watering down the R2P idea.36 
But the document still endorses the normative impulse behind R2P: that 
outside states should try to protect at-risk populations, even if not with armed 
force. The document declares that the “international community . . . . has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means . . . to help to protect populations from [atrocities].”37 Moreover, once 
the outcome document put to the side the question of humanitarian interven-
tions, R2P’s popularity grew. Dozens of states have established so-called “focal 
points” on R2P—national offices that are designed to promote R2P internally 
and coordinate with other actors internationally.38 Within the United Nations, 
the Secretary General, Security Council, and General Assembly have all re-
peatedly engaged on R2P and, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, supported 
the basic idea.39 The Secretary General has also appointed two special advisers 
on R2P—one to focus on genocide, and the other to work on R2P more gener-
ally.40 With all this support, the Secretary General proudly proclaimed in 2011 
that, notwithstanding the persistent question of how to implement R2P, “[n]o 
government questions the principle” itself.41 
And yet, the implementation question is real. R2P offers little concrete 
guidance on what outside states should do for at-risk populations.42 This, then, 
is R2P’s principal challenge: translating its basic principle into an operational 
doctrine. To be clear, this doctrine need not be exclusively legal in form. Mere 
policy proposals might induce certain outside states to act; states might them-
selves support the proposals or be responsive to constituents who do. But as-
signing outside states operative legal duties would mean establishing the expec-
tation that helping at-risk populations is not always discretionary—and that not 
helping can legitimately trigger an outside state’s responsibility. 
 
 34. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 3, ¶ 139. 
 35. See Mohamed, supra note 11, at 326-28. 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 328 (“The responsibility to protect emerged from the World Summit signif-
icantly bruised.”); Thomas G. Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 741, 750 
(2006) (describing this formulation as “R2P-lite”). 
 37. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 3, ¶ 139. 
 38. See Our Work: R2P Focal Points, GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/r2p_focal_points (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
 39. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text; U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 3, 
U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009) (statement of Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, President of the Gen-
eral Assembly) (recognizing during General Assembly discussions that “there is . . . broad agreement 
that the international community can no longer remain silent in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity,” despite the “prevailing lack of trust in developing countries 
when it comes to the use of force for humanitarian reasons”). 
 40. See U.N. Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Mission Statement, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
 41. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Remarks at Breakfast Roundtable with Foreign 
Ministers, The Responsibility to Protect: Responding to Imminent Threats of Mass Atrocities (Sept. 23, 
2011), http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=5567. 
 42. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
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III. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF COLLECTIVE DUTIES 
Almost all of the R2P literature envisions outside states implementing 
R2P collectively—by banding together to help at-risk populations. This vision 
drives even the language that is used to articulate R2P. R2P’s burdens are said 
to fall first on the territorial state and then on the international community as a 
whole. Two kinds of legal claims support this vision. One is that an R2P duty 
falls simultaneously on all outside states, such that they all must satisfy the 
same basic standard in any R2P scenario. This claim tries to pin responsibility 
on every state that does not do enough for the at-risk population. The second 
claim is that the R2P duty falls not on states themselves but on states’ collective 
organizations, like the United Nations or analogous regional organizations. 
Here, not satisfying the duty would trigger the organization’s responsibility. 
These legal claims have some intuitive appeal. Measures to help an at-risk 
population might well be more effective or legitimate if they are taken collec-
tively than if they are taken by only one or a small handful of states.43 Moreo-
ver, if an R2P duty were widely distributed, then all outside states would have 
to pitch in. None would carry too heavy a burden. Nevertheless, neither of these 
claims is likely to gain legal traction in the near term. 
A. Assigning R2P to All Outside States Simultaneously 
The claim that R2P demands action by all outside states simultaneously 
has some authoritative support but remains almost entirely aspirational.44 This 
claim treats all outside states as if they are in the same boat; none is uniquely 
obligated to help the at-risk population or responsible when that population suf-
fers.45 As David Miller has explained, “an undistributed duty . . . to which eve-
rybody is subject is likely to be discharged by nobody unless it can be allocated 
in some way.”46 To appreciate the problem, consider three discrete contexts in 
which the claim appears, plus evidence that it is inoperative. 
First, the 1949 Geneva Conventions require states to “ensure respect” for 
the Conventions “in all circumstances.”47 This language is widely interpreted 
 
 43. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Na-
tions, 20 INT’L ORG. 367, 375 (1966). 
 44. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text; cf. Christian J. Tams, Individual States as 
Guardians of Community Interests, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 379, 400-01 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he few existing 
enforcement duties tend to be approached in a rather cavalier way.”). 
 45. Philosophers sometimes call this kind of duty “imperfect” because it is not owed by or to 
any particular agent. See, e.g., Terry Nardin, Introduction to HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NOMOS 
XLVII 1, 14-16 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2006). 
 46. DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 98 (2007); see also 
Alex J. Bellamy, Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 135, 
147 (2008) (“[T]he whole concept of responsibility is rendered meaningless without a related concept of 
where that responsibility resides.”). 
 47. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I) art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II) art. 1, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III) art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
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to mean that every party must try to avert ongoing war crimes, no matter where 
or by whom the crimes are committed.48 State officials verbally endorse that 
interpretation49 but regularly ignore it in practice.50 What’s more, states that 
stand by in the face of ongoing war crimes are rarely, if ever, held responsible. 
Second, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which the Internation-
al Law Commission (ILC) adopted in 2001, aim to identify when states are re-
sponsible for violating international law and what follows from these viola-
tions. The ILC spent decades developing the draft articles and, from early on, 
sought to attach special consequences to especially egregious violations.51 In 
the end, the draft articles declare that all “[s]tates shall cooperate to bring to an 
end . . . serious breach[es]” of peremptory norms.52 The category of perempto-
ry norms is notoriously indeterminate but, by all accounts, includes mass 
atrocities.53 Thus, any duty to cooperate on peremptory norms should come in-
to play in scenarios that implicate R2P. 
Yet the ILC’s draft articles do not even try to identify the conduct that 
would satisfy a duty to cooperate—or, therefore, when a state might be respon-
sible for not cooperating. Though the ILC posits that cooperation can be “non-
institutionalized,” it assumes that most cooperation will occur through interna-
tional organizations.54 The ILC does not identify what states must do in these 
 
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV) art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
 48. See Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law (Rules 144-148), in 1 JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 509-10 (2005); Giorgio Gaja, Do States Have a Duty to Ensure 
Compliance with Obligations Erga Omnes by Other States?, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 31, 33-34 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005). 
 49. See Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law Erga Omnes (practice relating 
to Rule 144), in 2 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3289-302 (2005) (collecting declarations). 
 50. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: ICRC EXPERT SEMINARS, at 3-8 (Oct. 2003) (acknowledging 
that the supposed duty is not yet operational because states lack the political will to implement it); Carlo 
Focarelli, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125 
(2010) (arguing that the supposed duty is not meaningfully enforceable); Toni Pfanner, Various Mecha-
nisms and Approaches for Implementing International Humanitarian Law and Protecting and Assisting 
War Victims, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 279, 305-06 (2009) (recognizing that “states have rarely ven-
tured beyond discreet representations behind the scenes” to try to avert others’ war crimes). 
 51. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, ch. III, pmbl., cmt. 5 (“From the first 
it was recognized that these developments [on peremptory norms] had implications for the secondary 
rules of State responsibility which would need to be reflected in some way in the Articles.”). Initially, 
the ILC sought to establish a category of violations that were so serious that they qualified as “crimes of 
State.” See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT 
ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Joseph H.H. Weiler et al. eds., 1989) (analyzing the ILC’s ear-
lier efforts). 
 52. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, art. 41, § 1. The draft articles also 
articulate a duty not to recognize situations created by these breaches. See id. art. 41, § 2. The ILC 
commentary suggests that a duty not to recognize kicks in after the violation has ceased and is mostly 
relevant in cases involving aggressive force or the right to self-determination. It is not clear how, if at 
all, such a duty would help avert atrocities, so I do not address the idea here. 
 53. See id. art. 40, cmts. 2-6; ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 50-66 (2006). 
 54. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, art. 41, cmt. 2; see also Nina H.B. 
Jørgensen, The Responsibility to Protect and the Obligations of States and Organisations under the Law 
of International Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE, supra 
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organizations, other than simply participate.55 More significantly, the ILC 
acknowledges that any duty to cooperate to end violations of peremptory norms 
might still be aspirational and not (yet) effective law.56 
Finally, in its 2007 judgment in the Bosnia-Serbia Genocide Case, the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) determined that the Genocide Convention ob-
ligates states to try to avert genocidal conduct in and by third states.57 This in-
terpretation is progressive and potentially far-reaching.58 It arguably requires 
every party to the Convention to act in the face of genocide. After all, every 
party has the same obligation under the Convention’s text. However, the ICJ 
limited that expansive implication. The court explained that the duty to prevent 
genocide requires different measures of each state, depending on that state’s 
particular tools for averting a crisis.59 As a practical matter, an outside state 
that lacks any nexus to or mechanisms for averting a crisis might not have to do 
anything at all. The claim that every state must try to avert genocide seems 
more expansive than the ICJ’s own interpretation and is, in any event, unsup-
ported by state practice.60 Here again, the claim that a legal duty attaches sim-
ultaneously to all outside states is inoperative. 
B. Assigning R2P to International Organizations 
An alternative claim seeks to attach the R2P duty not to individual states 
but to their collective organizations. The claim that international organizations 
(IOs) must implement R2P is principally directed at the U.N. Security Council 
and reflects, at least in part, R2P’s historic association with the use of force.61 
Some have argued for requiring the Council to act in humanitarian crises,62 or 
 
note 8, at 125, 129 (explaining that the ILC “appears to envisage a form of collective response through 
the organised international community, that is, the UN”). 
 55. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, art. 41, cmt. 2 (“Because of the di-
versity of circumstances which could possibly be involved, the [draft article] does not prescribe in detail 
what form this cooperation should take.”). 
 56. Id. art. 41, cmt. 3 (“It may be open to question whether general international law at present 
prescribes a positive duty of cooperation, and [any such duty] may reflect the progressive development 
of the law.”). 
 57. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 47, ¶ 438 (Feb. 26). Serbia inherited this case when the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) dissolved. Although the court assessed the conduct of the FRY and 
not of Serbia as such, I use “FRY” interchangeably with “Serbia” for ease of reference. 
 58. Id.; see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 545-46 (1st ed. 
2000) (describing as “progressive” any interpretation that “requires States to take action not just within 
their own borders but outside them”); Marko Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-
Up, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669, 687 (2007) (describing the ICJ’s interpretation as “extremely progressive”). 
 59. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, 2007 
I.C.J. ¶ 430. 
 60. But cf. HR 6 september 2013, _____, _____ m.nt. ___ (Nederland/Nuhanovic) (Neth.). 
Case 12/03324 (Sept. 6, 2013) (finding that Dutch peacekeepers unlawfully evicted from their base Bos-
nian men who were later killed). 
 61. For an argument that regional organizations have a residual duty that kicks in when the 
U.N. Security Council stalls, see ICISS REPORT, supra note 9, ¶¶ 6.28, 6.31-.35; CRISTINA GABRIELA 
BADESCU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: SECURITY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 84 (2011); and Kristin M. Haugevik, Regionalising the Responsibility to Protect: Possi-
bilities, Capabilities and Actualities, 1 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 346, 350-51 (2009). 
 62. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 
21st Century: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 219, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000) (“Where such 
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for restricting the use of the veto in such cases.63 Yet the claim against IOs is 
not directed exclusively at the Security Council. For example, the U.N. Secre-
tary General has identified varied proactive measures that different kinds of IOs 
might coordinate or implement.64 
The claim that an R2P duty attaches to IOs is likely to confront serious 
hurdles in the near term. First, the U.N. Security Council and its regional ana-
logs are run by states. If R2P duties are not functional when they demand that 
all outside states act simultaneously, why would the duties become functional 
simply by demanding that states act through collective organizations? The de-
mand on any particular state would still be diluted, both because of the number 
of states involved and because holding particular states responsible would mean 
piercing the IO’s veil.65 
Second, the relevant IOs are, at bottom, political bodies. They have broad 
discretion to decide whether and how to help an at-risk population, and they ul-
timately may decide to do nothing.66 This does not mean that IOs may do 
whatever they please.67 For example, the U.N. Security Council is generally 
 
crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral 
duty to act on behalf of the international community.”); ICISS REPORT, supra note 9, ¶ 6.24 (arguing 
that R2P requires the Security Council to practice “clear and responsible leadership . . . especially when 
significant loss of human life is occurring or is threatened”); Arbour, supra note 30, at 454; cf. Neville F. 
Dastoor, The Responsibility to Refine: The Need for a Security Council Committee on the Responsibility 
to Protect, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 25, 30-32, 48-56 (2009) (arguing for a new Security Council commit-
tee to help implement R2P). 
 63. See, e.g., Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, & Switzerland, Draft Res.: Im-
proving the Working Methods of the Security Council, Annex, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.49 (Mar. 17, 
2006) (“A permanent member of the Security Council using its veto should explain the reason for doing 
so . . . .”); Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 2, ¶ 61 
(urging the permanent members not to threaten or use the veto in “situations of manifest failure to meet 
obligations relating to the responsibility to protect”); ICISS REPORT, supra note 9, ¶ 6.21 (“[A] perma-
nent member, in matters where its vital national interests [are] not claimed to be involved, [should] not 
use its veto to obstruct the passage of what would otherwise be a majority resolution.”); Ariela Blätter & 
Paul D. Williams, The Responsibility Not to Veto, 3 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 301, 313-20 (2011) 
(reviewing proposals to restrict the veto and arguing for an “unofficial agreement” among the permanent 
members not to use the veto); Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
513, 539 (2009) (“The endorsement of R2P as a legal principle fully thought through means that a per-
manent member’s exercise of the veto power in an R2P case would be illegal.”). 
 64. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 2, 
¶¶ 28-48; see also Arbour, supra note 30, at 456-57 (discussing potential roles for different U.N. or-
gans); Alex J. Bellamy, Making RtoP a Living Reality: Reflections on the 2012 General Assembly Dia-
logue on Timely and Decisive Response, 5 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 109, 122-24 (2013) (suggesting 
that IOs coordinate on R2P). 
 65. Cf. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations with Commentaries, 
art. 40, cmt. 1, in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 63d Sess., Apr. 26-June 3, July 4-Aug. 12, 2011, ¶¶ 
87-88, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2011) [hereinafter Draft Articles on IO 
Responsibility] (“International organizations having a separate legal personality are in principle the only 
subjects that bear international responsibility for their international wrongful acts.”). But cf. Anne Peters, 
The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect, 8 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 1, 29–35 (2011) (arguing that, as 
a practical matter, the Security Council’s responsibility would attach to U.N. member states). 
 66. See Nico Krisch, Article 39, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY 1272, 1275-76 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2012); Natalino Ronzitti, The Current Status of 
Legal Principles Prohibiting the Use of Force and Legal Justifications of the Use of Force, in 
REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 91, 108 (Michael Bothe et al. 
eds., 2005); Jared Schott, Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative Ideal of 
Emergency, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 24, 38 (2007) (“Amongst the international legal community, it is 
widely accepted that a Council determination or inaction under Article 39 . . . is nonjusticiable.”). 
 67. See, e.g., ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL 202 (2011) 
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expected to account for human rights interests when it makes decisions.68 But 
the Council has considerable discretion to weigh those interests against the 
countervailing considerations that favor or disfavor a particular decision.69 
Proposals to further constrain the Council’s discretion,70 including proposals 
on R2P,71 have had little success. The idea that the Council is obligated to re-
spond to humanitarian crises is, in José Alvarez’s words, “absurdly premature 
and not likely to be affirmed by state practice.”72 
Third, even if IOs had an R2P duty, the extent to which it could meaning-
fully be enforced is unclear.73 IOs are rarely held responsible for international 
legal violations.74 Part of the reason for the dearth of relevant practice is that 
 
(“The threat of massive disobedience . . . is a potent tool for inducing compliance of a powerful organ 
[such as the Security Council] with international law.”); cf. Ian Hurd, The Strategic Use of Liberal In-
ternationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992–2003, 59 INT’L ORG. 495, 523 (2005) (“Once the 
dominant powers have come to rely in part on a legitimated institution to provide order in the interna-
tional system, . . . their influence thereafter relies on a perpetual effort to police and maintain the legiti-
macy of the institution.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Daniel W. Drezner, Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory 
and Practice, 13 INT’L STUD. REV. 96, 104 (2011) (explaining that the Council has shifted from com-
prehensive to more targeted sanctions to account for human rights interests); Nico Krisch, Article 41, in 
2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 66, at 1317 (“[T]he [Security 
Council] has recognized that, when taking action under Art. 41, it is bound to take into account the hu-
manitarian consequences and human rights implications . . . .”); cf. U.N. Secretariat, Secretary-
General’s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, § 1.1, 
U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999) (“[F]undamental principles of international humanitarian 
law . . . are applicable to United Nations forces [under U.N. command and control] when in situations of 
armed conflict.”). The Council is expected to account for human rights interests, even though the specif-
ic bases for assigning it legal duties are uncertain and contested. See, e.g., Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The 
Security Council and Issues of Responsibility, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 349 (2011); Frédéric 
Mégret & Florian Hoffmann, The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Na-
tions Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 314 (2003); August Reinisch, Securing 
the Accountability of International Organizations, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 131 (2001). 
 69. See Nico Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework, in 2 THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 66, at 1258 (“It is then up to the [Se-
curity Council] to strike the concrete balance between humanitarian and human rights concerns and the 
goal of maintaining peace.”). 
 70. See, e.g., BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO 
263-75 (1998) (describing proposals to restrain the use of the veto); Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Ad-
judication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 
303–07 (2008) (arguing for a set of procedural reforms to decrease the Council’s “deliberative deficit” 
and increase its legitimacy). 
 71. See sources cited supra notes 62-63; ICISS REPORT, supra note 9, ¶¶ 6.13-.27; Special 
Rapporteur on Resp. of Int’l Orgs., Third Rep. on Responsibility of International Organizations, ¶ 10, 
Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/553 (May 13, 2005) (by Giorgio Gaja) (suggesting that the U.N. 
is responsible for failing to address atrocities). 
 72. José E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE 
USE OF FORCE 275, 282 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008). 
 73. See, e.g., Anastasia Telestsky, Binding the United Nations: Compulsory Review of Dis-
putes Involving UN International Responsibility Before the International Court of Justice, 21 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 75, 80 (2012) (noting that the ILC’s recent draft articles on IO responsibility fail to answer how 
the U.N. might be held responsible). 
 74. Draft Articles on IO Responsibility, supra note 65, at 2, cmt. 5 (“One of the main difficul-
ties in elaborating rules concerning the responsibility of international organizations is due to the limited 
availability of pertinent practice.”); Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Ob-
servations Received From International Organizations, Int’l Law Comm’n, 63d Sess. Apr. 26-June 3, 
July 4-Aug. 12, 2011, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/637 (Feb. 14, 2011) (EU statement that “some commen-
taries show that there is very little or no relevant practice to support the [ILC’s] suggested provisions” 
on the responsibility of IOs); William E. Holder, Can International Organizations Be Controlled? Ac-
countability and Responsibility, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 231, 234 (2003) (“[I]nternational practice 
is in fact quite scant and precedents for claims against international organizations are few.”). Note that 
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international and national courts commonly lack jurisdiction over claims 
against IOs.75 However, even the more informal enforcement tools that are 
used against scofflaw states—like tit-for-tat noncompliance or verbal denuncia-
tions—might be maladapted for IOs.76 IOs are likely to be less responsive to 
such enforcement than are individual states because IOs are more diverse and 
less unified. A claimant who tries to enforce an R2P duty against the IO pre-
sumably would have to convince many states, not just one, to take that duty se-
riously. 
IV. THE POTENTIAL OF INDIVIDUAL DUTIES 
The claim that outside states should collectively implement R2P trans-
lates poorly to international law. No matter whether the claim is directed at all 
outside states simultaneously or at states’ collective organizations, it is unlikely 
to garner support from international law. Instead, R2P should offer a frame-
work for obligating and then holding responsible particular outside states. Each 
state should have multiple, discrete duties relating to R2P. And in any given 
case, responsibility for one or another duty should attach to the state or small 
handful of states that, because of their own conduct or relationships, have 
unique ties to the situation. This alternative vision for R2P is appealing because 
it is already rooted in international law and thus has the potential to gain legal 
traction going forward. 
 
the United Nations sometimes compensates states or individuals for particular kinds of harms. See, e.g., 
G.A. Res. 63/253, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/253 (Mar. 17, 2009) (employment-related harms); 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Ko-
sovo, Regulation No. 2006/12 on the Establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel, ¶ 1.2, U.N. 
Doc. UNMIK/REG/2006/12 (Mar. 23, 2006) (rights-related harms); Responsibility of International Or-
ganizations: Comments and Observations Received From International Organizations, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 63d Sess. Apr. 26-June 3, July 4-Aug. 12, 2011, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (Feb. 17, 
2011) [hereinafter U.N. Comments on Draft Articles on IO Responsibility] (economic harms). But even 
when the United Nations makes such payments, it typically preserves its discretion not to make them 
and denies that they are legally obligated. See U.N. Secretary General, Secretary General’s Bulletin: 
Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, Rule 105.12, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/7 (May 
9, 2003) (“Ex gratia payments may be made in cases where, although in the opinion of the Legal Coun-
sel there is no clear legal liability on the part of the United Nations, payment is in the interest of the Or-
ganization.”); José E. Alvarez, Revisiting the ILC’s Draft Rules on International Organization Respon-
sibility, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 344, 347 (2011); Hemi Mistry, International Law Meeting 
Summary: The Kosovo Human Rights Advisory Panel Chatham House, CHATHAM HOUSE 10 (Jan. 26, 
2012), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/60112 
summary.pdf. 
 75. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, § 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055 (“Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.”); General Agreement on Privileges and 
Immunities of the Council of Europe art. 3, Sep. 2, 1949, 250 U.N.T.S. 14; Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, Annexes 1-18, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261; Conven-
tion on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. II, § 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 
U.N.T.S. 15; Reinisch, supra note 68, at 139-41; Holder, supra note 74, at 244. The jurisdictional limits 
do not provide the full answer, however, because third-party dispute resolution bodies sometimes have 
jurisdiction over IOs. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of Ameri-
ca Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, U.S.-U.N., art. 8, § 21(a), June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 
3416; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra, art. VIII, § 30. 
 76. See Draft Articles on IO Responsibility, supra note 65, art. 51, cmts. 4, 6 (recognizing that 
the “[p]ractice concerning countermeasures taken against international organizations is undoubtedly 
scarce,” and that countermeasures might be ill-suited for IOs because they might “hamper the function-
ing of the responsible international organization and therefore endanger the attainment of the objectives 
for which that organization was established”). 
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Some readers might instinctively worry about encouraging outside states 
to act individualistically.77 Working through an IO or with other states can 
curb a state’s opportunistic impulses or legitimize efforts to help the at-risk 
population. In contrast, acting alone gives the outside state more leeway to ex-
ploit its power for its own gains, to the potential detriment of the territorial state 
or population. This worry is understandable but should not be overstated. Out-
side states that want to act opportunistically may already do so. They may take 
non-forcible measures, without going through an IO, to help at-risk popula-
tions.78 The question is when to convert that right into a duty—when to require 
outside states to take measures that they might otherwise forego. Any such duty 
could be crafted to lessen, rather than increase, the risk of individual states act-
ing invidiously. For instance, certain R2P duties might kick in only after an 
outside state has inserted itself into a situation.79 Such duties might dissuade 
states from getting involved in the first place or might influence states that are 
involved to act benevolently. 
Other readers might object that my vision is instead too cautious. The du-
ties that exist or realistically might emerge in international law will sometimes 
be too weak to protect people from atrocities. The chances of success might be 
higher if states banded together, or if responsibility fell on states that were not 
already implicated in the situation by virtue of their own conduct or relation-
ships. Yet the vision that I advance would establish only a floor—not necessari-
ly a ceiling—of what outside states might do. States that want to do more al-
ways could. Further, even if R2P’s legal articulation is limited in the ways that 
I suggest, its normative impulse and rhetoric might be available to advocate for 
more robust, discretionary, and collective action. 
A. Theoretical Foundations 
I turn, then, to demonstrating that this vision for R2P is rooted in existing 
international law. International law has two natural starting points for thinking 
about R2P: human rights law and the law on state responsibility. These two 
bodies of law provide a foundation for assigning outside states duties that bene-
 
 77. Cf., e.g., G.A. Res. 53/141, para. 8-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/141 (Mar. 8, 1999) (rejecting 
“unilateral coercive measures . . . as tools for political or economic pressure against any country”); Spe-
cial Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fourth Rep. on the Content, Forms and Degrees of Int’l Resp. 
(Part 2 of the Draft Articles), Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 100, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/366 (Apr. 14-15, 1983) (by 
Willem Riphagen) (“[T]he presence of a collective interest . . . should imply a collective decision-
making machinery as regards reprisals . . . .”). 
 78. International law differentiates between non-forcible measures that comply with the acting 
state’s legal obligations and non-forcible measures that do not comply. Compliant measures are lawful. 
See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, at ch. II, cmt. 3; CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, 
ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-9 (2005). Noncompliant measures 
are usually unlawful but can be excused as countermeasures, when they are taken against a scofflaw 
state. In most circumstances, countermeasures are available only to states that have been specifically 
injured by the scofflaw’s breach. But the weight of state practice suggests that, in cases involving espe-
cially egregious human rights violations, countermeasures are available to all states. See ELENA 
KATSELLI PROUKAKI, THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 204-07 (2010); TAMS, 
supra, at 208–51; Martin Dawidowicz, Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An 
Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and Their Relationship to the UN Security 
Council, 77 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 333 (2006). 
 79. See infra Section IV.B. 
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fit foreign populations and then for allocating the associated responsibilities. 
1. The Seeds for Prescribing R2P-Relevant Conduct 
Human rights law and the law on state responsibility both seek to pre-
scribe R2P-relevant conduct. Like R2P, human rights law is fundamentally 
concerned with protecting people from harm. This body of law recognizes a 
broad range of rights—for instance, rights to life, liberty, health, and food.80 It 
then assigns states three kinds of duties to help realize those rights.81 Duties to 
respect are paradigmatic duties not to intrude on rights. For instance, a duty to 
respect the right to life prohibits states from arbitrarily killing people. A duty to 
respect the right to food prohibits states from actively depriving people of food. 
Duties to protect require states to try to restrain third parties from violating 
rights. Protecting the right to life means taking reasonable steps—or as some-
times stated, exercising due diligence—to prevent murder. Depending on the 
circumstances, a duty-holding state might have to clamp down on gang-related 
violence or try to incapacitate someone who is about to detonate a bomb. Final-
ly, duties to fulfill require states to help realize positive liberties. These duties 
are unlike the other two in that they do not assume a single, identifiable abuser. 
Fulfilling the right to life might mean guaranteeing emergency medical care or 
responding competently to a natural disaster.82 
That taxonomy of human rights duties is conceptually useful for R2P. It 
reminds us that one objective—like avoiding unnecessary losses of life—can 
justify multiple duties. States might have to achieve that objective in different 
ways. Moreover, disaggregating the objective might make it more manageable. 
Rather than establish one daunting duty to avoid unnecessary losses of life, 
human rights law establishes three more concrete duties: a duty not to kill un-
necessarily, a duty to try to protect people from third-party killings, and a duty 
to create conditions in which life is not unduly at risk. R2P would benefit from 
a similar approach. R2P is currently fashioned as an all-encompassing duty to 
protect—a duty to try to shield people from third-party atrocities. R2P might 
instead articulate a bundle of more discrete duties. 
The question, then, is how to define those duties. Human rights law pro-
vides a potentially useful model for R2P but would have to be further devel-
oped to support R2P. As a matter of positive law, human rights law applies 
principally in a state’s own territory, for the benefit of its own population.83 
 
 80. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 81. See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extrater-
ritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 
1084, 1090 (2012) (“The obligation to comply with internationally recognized human rights imposes 
three levels of duties on states: to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights.”). For a review of various 
efforts to expand these duties, or to develop slightly different or more precise duties, see MAGDALENA 
SEPÚLVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 157-248 (2003). 
 82. Cf. Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoorsamity v. West Bengal, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 37 (India) (find-
ing that the right to life grounds a duty to provide emergency medical care). 
 83. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 2, § 1 (obligating each party to respect and ensure 
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The current trend is to expand the extraterritorial scope of application of human 
rights law.84 Yet this trend is contested85 and deeply under-theorized.86 Most 
decisions that apply human rights law extraterritorially do so by reference to 
state control. The more control a state exercises in an extraterritorial setting, the 
greater the likelihood that the state will be held to its human rights duties.87 
But the relevant decisions lack a coherent account of when and why control 
matters. These decisions vary on the kinds of extraterritorial control that trigger 
a state’s human rights duties;88 on whether factors other than control can trig-
ger these duties;89 and on whether the duties are always triggered simultane-
 
rights of individuals “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”); Legal Consequences of Con-
struction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 109 (July 9) 
(“[T]he jurisdiction of States [for purposes of applying human rights law] is primarily territorial . . . .”); 
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 2011 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 131-32 (explaining that state 
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights are “primarily territorial” and apply extra-
territorially only in “exceptional circumstances”). 
 84. See MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
1 (2011) (“[T]he impact of human rights treaties in an extraterritorial context is growing . . . .”); John 
Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power: The Intersection of Human Rights Law & the Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial Context, 40 ISR. L. REV. 396, 431-36 (2007) (arguing that recent 
ICJ jurisprudence suggests a “trend in favor of more relaxed standards for extraterritorial application” of 
the ICCPR). 
 85. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United States 
of America Submitted Under Article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex I, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005) (“[T]he obligations assumed by a State Party to the [ICCPR] ap-
ply only within the territory of the State Party”); Human Rights Comm., Information Received from the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Implementation of the Concluding Obser-
vations of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6/Add.1 (Nov. 3, 2009) 
(“[T]he Covenant could only have effect outside the territory of the UK in very exceptional circum-
stances.”). 
 86. MILANOVIC, supra note 84, at 264 (describing the relevant decisions—particularly the de-
cisions of the European Court of Human Rights—as so “unprincipled and unworkable” that they “cannot 
be fixed with a minor ‘clarification’ here or a ‘distinguishing’ there” because “[w]hat it needs is radical 
surgery”). 
 87. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
 88. Human rights duties probably apply when a state controls foreign territory or has physical 
custody over someone on foreign soil. See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turk., App. No. 15318/89, Ser. A, No. 310, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 62-64 (1995) (control over territory); Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19) (same); Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, App. 
No. 61498/08, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212, ¶ 57 (2010) (control over person); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cul-
tural Rights, Rep. on its 18th and 19th Sess., Apr. 27-May 15, Nov. 16-Dec. 4, 1998, ¶¶ 232, 234, U.N. 
Doc. E/1999/22, E/C.12/1998/26, Supp. No. 2 (1999) (control over territories or populations). However, 
it is not clear what other kinds of control suffice—and particularly, whether duties to respect always 
apply extraterritorially on the ground that a state is always presumed to control its own conduct. Com-
pare, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Saldías de López v. Uruguay, ¶ 12.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (July 29, 1981) (“[A] State party [may not] perpetrate violations . . . on the terri-
tory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”), and Issa v. Turk., 
App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567, 588 (2004) (same), and Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 doc. 6 rev. ¶ 25 (1999) (same), with, 
e.g., Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 131 (“[A]cts of the Contracting States performed . . . outside their 
territories can [trigger human rights duties] only in exceptional cases.”). 
 89. Compare, e.g., Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 325–35 
(2007) (reviewing cases and concluding that “the basic requirement for extraterritorial application . . . is 
effective control, either over a territory or over a person”), and sources cited supra note 88 (predicating 
extraterritorial application on indicia of control), with, e.g., Saldaño v. Argentina, Petition, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 17 (“[A] state . . . may be responsi-
ble under certain circumstances for the acts and omissions of its agents which produce effects . . . out-
side that state’s own territory.”), and De Schutter et al., supra note 81, at 1149-54 (asserting that duties 
to fulfill apply extraterritorially on the basis of states’ capacities). 
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ously or can be triggered piecemeal, depending on the circumstances of a 
case.90 Further, whatever the extraterritorial scope of a state’s ordinary human 
rights duties, its R2P duties might be more expansive. Outside states might rea-
sonably have more demanding duties in cases of atrocity. Indeed, the treaties 
that specifically regulate states on atrocities—the Geneva and Genocide Con-
ventions—are widely understood not to be territorially limited.91 Thus, R2P 
might build on human rights law but needs its own conceptual work. R2P must 
justify assigning duties to outside states in cases of atrocity. 
Likewise, R2P might build on the law on state responsibility. Recall that 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility claim a unique enforcement duty—a 
duty to cooperate on enforcement—in cases of atrocity. Like R2P, this claim is 
motivated by the idea that some human rights violations are so egregious that 
they justify a serious response.92 But alas, any duty to cooperate is not yet 
functional. The ILC could not identify the level or kind of cooperation that is 
required of outside states. Again, R2P must do more conceptual work. 
2. The Seeds for Grounding R2P Responsibilities 
The human rights duties and the supposed duty to cooperate raise a fol-
low-up question for my vision for R2P: if the duties go unsatisfied, when and 
why would particular outside states be responsible? The answer, I argue, must 
be extracted from the intersection between human rights law and the law on 
state responsibility. Under these two bodies of law, responsibility relating to 
human suffering stems from either the state’s own misconduct, the state’s 
unique relationship with the malfeasant, or a messy combination of both. 
To start, consider a state’s well-established duty not to commit atrocities 
in its territory.93 A territorial state that commits atrocities violates this duty and 
is responsible. But of course, the state cannot itself commit atrocities; the state 
is just a concept. A more accurate formulation is that the state is responsible if 
its agents commit atrocities. That formulation highlights three important points 
relating to state responsibility. First, state responsibility results from the con-
 
 90. Compare, e.g., Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 65 
(asking about “the scope and reach of the entire Convention system of human rights protection”), with, 
e.g., Al-Skeini, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 137 (explaining that the duties can, at least in 
some sense, “be ‘divided and tailored’”), and Cerone, supra note 84, at 397 (2007) (“[I]t may be that 
negative obligations apply whenever a state acts extraterritorially . . . but that the degree of positive ob-
ligations will be dependent upon the type and degree of control (or power or authority) exercised by the 
state”). 
 91. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 47, arts. 2-3; Application of Convention on Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 
183 (Feb. 26); Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Yugo.), Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595, ¶ 31 (July 11). 
 92. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, art. 12, cmt. 7 (asserting that 
“states have a special role [in creating peremptory norms] as par excellence the holders of normative 
authority on behalf of the international community” and that the violation of such norms might trigger “a 
stricter regime of responsibility than that applied to other internationally wrongful acts”). 
 93. This duty is both well established in human rights law, see supra Section IV.A, and part of 
the classic formulation on R2P, see INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND 147 (2001); Sheri P. 
Rosenberg, Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention, 1 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 442, 
450–53 (2009). 
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current application of so-called primary rules and secondary rules. The primary 
rules in human rights law prescribe certain conduct. Secondary rules in the law 
on state responsibility identify whether that conduct is attributable to a state 
and, if so, what follows from a breach. 
Second, although these two bodies of law are understood to be distinct, 
one sometimes turns on the other.94 For example, any duty to cooperate on en-
forcement under the secondary rules on state responsibility would kick in for 
only some primary rules—namely, the primary rules on peremptory norms. 
Likewise, primary rules in human rights law require a state to prevent its agents 
from committing atrocities precisely because they are its agents—as defined by 
the secondary rules on state responsibility. Under the law on state responsibil-
ity, state agents have particular kinds of relationships with the state. State offi-
cials of course qualify as agents.95 So do people who are not formally officials 
but nevertheless act on the state’s behalf. For example, the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility posit that if a state empowers a private entity to perform a 
classically governmental function, then the entity becomes an agent while per-
forming that function.96 If the state effectively controls someone’s conduct, the 
person becomes an agent while committing the conduct.97 
Third, a state is strictly responsible for its agents’ misconduct because it 
is expected to oversee its agents and ensure that they behave. To be clear, the 
state is responsible even if it did not actually oversee or control a particular 
agent. Control over someone can create an agency relationship if that relation-
ship does not otherwise exist,98 but a lack of control over someone who al-
ready qualifies as an agent does not dissolve the agency relationship or relieve 
the state of responsibility.99 The whole point of this strict responsibility regime 
is to encourage the state to establish control over its agents. 
I have argued in another work that human rights duties to protect reflect a 
similar logic.100 A state is not expected to oversee third parties—that is, people 
who are not its agents—to the same extent that it oversees its own agents. Con-
sequently, a state is not strictly responsible every time a third party violates 
rights. Duties to protect are due diligence duties, meaning that the state is re-
sponsible only if it (or more precisely, its agents) should have done more to re-
strain the third party. Moreover, whether a state should have made that effort 
 
 94. On the muddiness between international law’s primary and secondary rules, see André 
Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework, 34 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 359, 408-15 (2013). 
 95. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, art. 4. 
 96. Id. art. 5. 
 97. Id. art. 8. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. art. 4, cmt. 9 (“[I]t is . . . irrelevant whether the internal law of the State in question 
gives the [State] power to compel the [agent] to abide by the State’s international obligations.”); id. art. 
5, cmt. 7 (“[T]here is no need to show that the conduct was in fact carried out under the control of the 
State.”); id. art. 7, cmt. 2 (asserting that the state is responsible even when an agent “has manifestly ex-
ceeded its competence”). 
 100. Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341 (2010). Note that, 
because both kinds of duties are relationally grounded, they sometimes are conflated or bleed into each 
other at the margins. See id. at 353-54; infra notes 139-151 and accompanying text (discussing exam-
ples). 
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depends largely on the nature of its relationship with the third party. A state 
must try to restrain third parties in its territory because of its governance rela-
tionship with those actors. States exist, at least in part, to maintain order and 
enforce the law against inhabitants who might intrude on individual liberties.101 
I demonstrate in Section IV.B that, where international law already holds 
an outside state responsible for human suffering, it likewise does so on the ba-
sis of the state’s own conduct or relationships. These grounds for pinning re-
sponsibility on a state are in tension with two other grounds that appear in the 
R2P literature. First, most of the R2P literature assumes that all outside states 
are in the same boat—that none has a legally relevant nexus to the at-risk popu-
lation that justifies holding it, but not all other outside states, responsible. In 
fact, outside states can be differently situated relative to the at-risk population. 
Some outside states might participate in or contribute to a humanitarian crisis, 
or might have a unique relationship with the perpetrators. These factors justify 
pinning responsibility on those outside states, even if not on all others. 
Second, some have proposed grounding outside state responsibility in 
each state’s positive capacity to help the at-risk population.102 This proposal 
arguably finds support in the Genocide Case. Recall that the ICJ interpreted the 
Genocide Convention to require outside states to try to prevent genocide. The 
ICJ then asserted that this duty is contingent on each state’s “capacity to influ-
ence” the perpetrators.103 Yet the ICJ did not define capacity in terms of the 
state’s overall military, financial, or diplomatic might. It defined capacity in re-
lational terms: 
This capacity itself depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of 
the State concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the politi-
cal links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State 
and the main actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also be as-
sessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act within the 
limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence may 
vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and persons 
facing the danger . . . .104 
 
 101. See, e.g., ICISS REPORT, supra note 9, ¶ 2.15; Rep. of the Secretary-General’s High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 32, ¶ 29; see also Michael Ignatieff, Intervention 
and State Failure, DISSENT, Winter 2002, at 114, 119 (“[S]tate sovereignty, instead of being the enemy 
of human rights, has to be seen as their basic precondition.”). This idea has deep roots in political theory. 
See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 153 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651); 
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 7-13, 123-30 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1689); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 24-25 (1974); MICHAEL 
WALZER, THINKING POLITICALLY 251-62 (2007); see also Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Gov-
ernment: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 512-20 (1991) (review-
ing political theories). 
 102. See PATTISON, supra note 8, at 36-38, 182 (arguing for assigning the duty primarily on the 
basis of each actor’s capacity to achieve good consequences); Luke Glanville, supra note 17, at 494-96 
(arguing that emergent norms assign the duty on the basis of a state’s capacity or historical ties to the 
population); see also Arbour, supra note 30, at 455 (arguing that states “with the capacity to project 
power and mobilise resources” have particular duties and that “powerful States may be reasonably ex-
pected to play a leading role in bolstering appropriate measures of prevention, dissuasion and remedy . . 
. commensurate with their weight, wealth, reach, and advanced capabilities”). 
 103. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 47, ¶ 430 (Feb. 26). 
 104. Id. 
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The nature of the state’s relationship with the perpetrators affects whether the 
state can and should exert its influence over them. 
In the Genocide Case, the ICJ was clearly focused on that relational ques-
tion. The ICJ underscored that, even though the perpetrators were not Serb 
agents, they received immense guidance and support from Serbia.105 Serbia’s 
dubious conduct—its support for an armed group in another state106—gave it a 
unique relationship with that group. Precisely for that reason, Serbia both could 
have and should have tried to restrain the group’s members from committing 
genocide. I return to the Genocide Case and its lessons for R2P below. The 
point here is that, although the judgment used the word “capacity,” it provides 
at best mild support for grounding responsibility in a state’s positive capacity to 
help. The judgment is instead consistent with my approach. Serbia’s responsi-
bility is justifiable because of a messy mix of its conduct and relationship with 
the Bosnian Serbs. 
In any event, grounding responsibility primarily in each state’s positive 
capacity would be misguided. States that are especially capable would repeat-
edly carry a disproportionate R2P burden, even if their involvement in the situ-
ation would lack legitimacy,107 even if other states are also highly capable (but 
less so),108 and even if those other states actually contributed to the problem. 
Moreover, grounding responsibility primarily in each state’s positive capacity 
would absolve states that are incapable, rather than encourage these states to 
develop some capacity.109 Of course, states are disparately capable and should 
 
 105. Id. ¶¶ 422, 434-38; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 156 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
 106. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) (explaining that the customary principle of non-intervention prohibits states 
from supporting “subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State”). 
 107. Cf. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Frame-
work for Business and Human Rights: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ¶¶ 68-69, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (arguing that a capacity-based framework improperly assumes that 
“can implies ought”). 
 108. Tan, supra note 17, at 102. 
 109. Perhaps for these reasons, human rights bodies generally assume that states either have or 
can develop the capacity to secure basic rights, at least in their own territories. See, e.g., Assanidze v. 
Georgia, App. No. 71503/01, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 221, ¶ 139 (explaining that control over an autono-
mous republic in the state’s territory created a “presumption of competence”). For example, these bodies 
commonly recommend the same measures to states with vastly different capacities. Compare, e.g., 
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Par-
ties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination: Germany, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/DEU/CO/18 (Aug. 21, 2008) (recommend-
ing that Germany “prevent and punish perpetrators of racially motivated acts of violence”), with, e.g., 
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Par-
ties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination: Cote d’Ivoire, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/1 (June 3, 2003) (recommending 
that Cote d’Ivoire “prevent a repetition of [racial and xenophobic] violence and punish the persons re-
sponsible for it”). Moreover, treaty bodies are generally unsympathetic to the idea that a state is ab-
solved of its human rights duties by virtue of its incapacity. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Considera-
tion of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Human 
Rights Committee: Algeria, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.95 (Aug. 18, 1998) (noting that “a general 
climate of violence heighten[s] [rather than mitigates] the responsibilities of the State party to re-
establish and maintain the conditions necessary for the enjoyment and protection of fundamental rights . 
. .”); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of 
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not have to do more than they can reasonably bear. An outside state that cannot 
satisfy an R2P duty unless it abandons other, more important duties might have 
a more lenient R2P duty or be excused altogether from a particular duty.110 But 
if the vast majority of outside states can reasonably satisfy a duty, then their re-
sponsibilities should not be allocated on the basis of their positive capacities. 
B. An Exemplary Bundle of R2P Duties 
A foundation for outside state responsibility exists in international law 
but must be further developed to support R2P. I outline below four plausible 
bases for holding an outside state responsible—when it: (1) participates in ex-
traterritorial atrocities, (2) does not make reasonable efforts to restrain third-
party participants, (3) obstructs a third party’s protective measures, or (4) does 
not help lessen the risk of atrocities breaking out. These four bases vary in the 
extent to which they are already established in international law. But each 
builds on the law’s existing foundation and pins responsibility on particular 
outside states by virtue of their own conduct or relationships. 
To be clear, my goal here is not to delineate precisely when outside states 
are or should be responsible. Neither is it to endorse this particular bundle of 
duties, or even to suggest that every duty in this bundle is realizable. My goal is 
to show that my vision for R2P—which would establish multiple R2P duties 
and assign responsibility on the basis of each state’s conduct or relationships—
has roots in and can continue to build on international law. 
1. Duty to Respect 
To begin, outside states might be responsible for participating in atroci-
ties. This responsibility might seem obvious because it already has solid sup-
port in international law, but it is completely absent from the R2P discourse. 
The R2P literature typically asserts a duty to respect only for the territorial 
state. The omission for other states might be an unfortunate oversight, or it 
might reflect a lingering discomfort with applying human rights duties extrater-
ritorially. In either event, responsibility for participating in extraterritorial 
atrocities exists or could easily develop in international law. 
As discussed, the treaties that specifically address atrocities—the Geneva 
and Genocide Conventions—are not geographically limited. War crimes and 
genocide are prohibited no matter where they occur. Yet because international 
 
the Convention: Comments of the Human Rights Committee: United Republic of Tanzania, ¶ 5, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/79/Add.12 (Dec. 28, 1992) (emphasizing that a reduction in available resources “does not 
exempt the State party from the full and effective application of the Covenant”). Indeed, even the treaty 
body that oversees the ICESCR, which expressly defines states’ duties by reference to capacity, see 
ICESCR, supra note 80, art. 2, § 1, assumes that all states can and must realize a minimum core of 
ICESCR rights, see Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, ¶ 10 (Dec. 14, 1990), reprinted in 1 INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, 
COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 7, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (May 27, 2008). 
 110. Cf. James W. Nickel, How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide, 15 
HUM. RTS. Q. 77, 81 (1993) (“When we ask whether a certain party can bear a burden, we really want to 
know whether that party can bear that burden without abandoning other responsibilities that ought not be 
abandoned.”). 
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law regulates atrocities piecemeal, the grounds for prohibiting other extraterri-
torial atrocities are murkier. In particular, some conduct that qualifies as a 
crime against humanity might fall through the law’s regulatory cracks. Crimes 
against humanity are catchall prohibitions that developed in customary law, 
primarily to penalize individuals.111 State officials who perpetrate these crimes 
are individually responsible. But for the state to be responsible, the conduct 
must violate one of its obligations.112 Although a state that commits crimes 
against humanity in its own territory clearly violates its human rights duties, the 
extent to which these duties apply extraterritorially is contested. The duties al-
most certainly apply when a state controls either foreign territory or persons on 
foreign soil, but the duties do not necessarily apply when the state’s situational 
control is more tenuous.113 For example, a state that sprays toxic chemicals 
over a foreign city or shares intelligence in order to assist with extraterritorial 
killings might not exercise the kind of control that clearly triggers human rights 
law. 
The territorial limits in human rights law thus raise a conceptual question 
for R2P: why would duties to respect ever be territorially limited? In other 
words, why wouldn’t international law always prohibit a state from intruding 
on human rights, no matter the state’s location or level of control? The best an-
swer is that most duties to respect balance the interest in protecting people from 
state intrusions against countervailing interests that justify such intrusions. The 
duty not to kill permits killings to protect innocents.114 The duty not to restrict 
religious expressions permits restrictions for public safety.115 Extraterritorial 
duties to respect are justifiably limited, then, if the balance that has been struck 
for a domestic setting is off-kilter for an extraterritorial one. A state that acts 
extraterritorially and without control might lack the tools and institutions that, 
back home, enable it to satisfy its legitimate interests with only minimal intru-
sions on individual liberties. 
This rationale for limiting duties to respect does not warrant giving states 
unbounded discretion to harm people abroad. It warrants accommodating the 
extraterritorial element by redefining the point at which a state intrusion is jus-
tifiable.116 Atrocities are, by definition, monstrous in kind or scale, so they 
 
 111. See STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISCHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 48-51 (3d 
ed. 2009); Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 
337-40 (2013). 
 112. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, art. 2., cmt. 7 & art. 58. 
 113. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, 
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 122 [hereinafter European Convention on Human 
Rights]; Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law En-
forcement Officials, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 91.IV.2 (1991) 
(“[I]ntentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect 
life.”). 
 115. See ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 18; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 
114, art. 9. 
 116. Most of the literature on the extraterritorial application of human rights law assumes that, 
if a duty to respect applies extraterritorially, the duty requires what it would domestically. See, e.g., Al-
Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 97-110 (2011); NOAM LUBELL, 
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cannot plausibly be justified by any countervailing interest. And indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine any state claiming a right to participate in atrocities just be-
cause it acts abroad. The best rationale for limiting duties to respect in more 
run-of-the-mill cases is inapt in cases of atrocity. 
Under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, a state would violate its 
R2P duty to respect not only by itself perpetrating atrocities but also by assist-
ing the perpetrators “with a view to facilitating” the atrocities.117 An assisting 
state would be responsible if its agents had something between the intent to 
commit atrocities and the knowledge that atrocities would be committed.118 In 
the above examples, purposefully spraying chemicals over a foreign population 
or sharing intelligence to facilitate atrocities would render the outside state re-
sponsible. 
2. Duty to Protect 
An outside state that does not itself participate in atrocities might have to 
try to restrain third-party participants; it might have an extraterritorial duty to 
protect. Such duties have already begun to emerge in international law. So far, 
they appear to be triggered by two kinds of relationships. An outside state 
might have these duties if it either exercises governmental authority over or 
substantially supports a third-party perpetrator. 
An outside state with governmental authority over an area might have to 
take measures to restrain the inhabitants from committing atrocities—as it 
would in its own territory. The ICJ’s Armed Activities decision is a case in 
point.119 The ICJ determined that Uganda had occupied portions of the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and, therefore, had “to protect the inhabit-
ants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such 
violence by any third party.”120 An occupying state, by definition, exercises 
governmental authority over foreign inhabitants.121 The fact that the state al-
ready exercises such authority justifies requiring it to exercise that authority in 
a particular way—to prevent the inhabitants from intruding on one another’s 
 
EXTRATERRITORI-AL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 205 (2010); Saldías de López v. 
Uruguay, ¶ 12.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (July 29, 1981). Under my approach, duties to re-
spect might apply in a greater range of extraterritorial settings, but these duties would be less onerous in 
certain extraterritorial settings than in ordinary, domestic settings. 
 117. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, art. 16, cmt. 5. 
 118. See id. art. 16, cmt. 4 (positing that the assisting state must “be aware of the circumstances 
making the conduct of the assisted State internationally wrongful”); see also Lea Brilmayer & Isaias 
Yemane Tesfalidet, Third State Obligations and the Enforcement of International Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 1, 37-51 (2011) (arguing that states should be obligated not to facilitate, support, or en-
courage violations and acknowledging that international law already “go[es] a long way towards estab-
lishing [that] sort of general obligation”). 
 119. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 
168 (Dec. 19). 
 120. Id. ¶ 178. 
 121. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, annexed to Con-
vention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 
(“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The 
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exer-
cised.”). 
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rights.122 
Much of the legal literature articulates a slightly different proposition: 
that extraterritorial duties to protect are triggered by a state’s physical control 
over foreign territory.123 States that control foreign territory through their po-
lice or military forces often also exercise governmental authority. For example, 
the ICJ determined in Armed Activities that Ugandan forces “were not only sta-
tioned in particular locations but also . . . substituted their own authority for 
that of the Congolese Government.”124 In particular, Uganda appointed a gov-
ernor to administer the occupied area.125 By contrast, duty-to-protect claims 
against states that exercise physical control without administrative authority 
have been unsuccessful. 
Consider two high-profile decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights. In Behrami v. France, the petitioners argued that France should have 
done more to protect two children from unexploded ordnance in post-conflict 
Kosovo.126 French troops were stationed in the area, but a U.N. organ adminis-
tered it and was in charge of the demining effort.127 The court did not hold 
France responsible.128 Likewise, in Cyprus v. Turkey, the petitioners sought to 
hold Turkey responsible for not restraining private actors who committed abus-
es in northern Cyprus.129 The court declined to do so.130 Although Turkish 
troops were stationed in northern Cyprus, most governance authority rested 
with the local Turkish Cypriot administration (the Turkish Republic of North-
ern Cyprus or TRNC).131 
Neither Behrami nor Cyprus offers a coherent account of why the duty-
to-protect claims failed.132 The European Court of Human Rights itself asserts 
 
 122. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 47, art. 27; see also Hans-Peter Gasser & Knut 
Dörmann, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 231, 277 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008) (“The occupying power must also take all 
measures to protect the inhabitants of occupied territories from violence by third parties.”). 
 123. Decisions commonly assert that a state’s control over territory triggers its human rights 
obligations. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 88-89; sources cited infra note 133. For the claim that 
territorial control does or should trigger a duty to protect, in particular, see MILANOVIC, supra note 84, 
at 263; and John Cerone, Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human 
Rights Law During Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1447, 1498-1505 (2006). 
 124. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 173 (identifying this 
standard); id. ¶ 176 (concluding that the standard was satisfied). 
 125. Id. ¶ 175. 
 126. Behrami v. France (Dec.), App. No. 71412/01, ¶¶ 5-7 (Eur. Ct. on H.R. May 5, 2007). 
 127. Id. ¶¶ 123-27. It was not clear whether the troops’ conduct was attributable to France or to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because it was not clear which entity exercised opera-
tional control over the troops. Id. ¶¶ 75-79, 140. The court avoided the duty-to-protect claim and thus 
did not reach the question of which entity—France or NATO—would be responsible if the troops failed 
to satisfy that duty. 
 128. Id. ¶ 153. 
 129. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
 130. Id. ¶¶ 80-81, 272, 324, 347-48, 376. 
 131. Id. ¶¶ 76-77. 
 132. On Behrami, see Hakimi, supra note 100, at 354, 359-60, 379. On Cyprus, see infra notes 
135-136 and accompanying text; Marko Milanovic, From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the 
Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 411, 422-26, 434-46 
(2008). 
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that control over foreign territory triggers the state’s human rights duties.133 
But the results in Behrami and Cyprus suggest that territorial control is by itself 
insufficient. Likewise, the results suggest that the state’s positive capacity does 
not trigger the duties. After all, states with troops on the ground presumably 
can act to restrain third parties. The two decisions are instead consistent with 
my approach. Duties to protect reflect a normative judgment that a particular 
state should act, given its relationship with the third party. The duties are ap-
propriate—in other words, the state should try to exert its power over the third 
party—if a governance relationship already exists. The duties become more 
suspect, however, if satisfying them would require an outside state to displace 
the entity that ordinarily or more legitimately governs, as the United Nations 
did in Kosovo and the TRNC did in northern Cyprus. 
Separately, a state’s extraterritorial duties to protect might be triggered if 
it substantially supports the third party that perpetrates atrocities. Cyprus is 
again instructive. Although the Cyprus court dismissed the claims arising out of 
the abuses by private actors, it held Turkey responsible as a result of the 
TRNC’s abuses.134 Again, the court’s reasoning was unsatisfying. At some 
points, the court suggested that the TRNC was a Turkish agent, despite the 
TRNC’s evident independence from Turkey.135 At other points, the court sug-
gested that Turkey’s territorial control triggered its duties to protect.136 But if 
Turkey’s territorial control triggered these duties, then why wouldn’t the duties 
apply to the alleged abuses by private actors? All of the alleged abuses oc-
curred in the same physical space. The bottom line is that, although the TRNC 
was not a Turkish agent under the general law on state responsibility, the 
TRNC did receive immense support from Turkey.137 Turkey propped up and 
supported the TRNC, so Turkey could not lawfully stand by in the face of the 
TRNC’s violations. 
Cyprus is not alone in enforcing extraterritorial duties to protect where a 
state substantially supports a non-state group that violates rights.138 Recall that, 
 
 133. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Ob-
ligations Apply Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389, 404-05 (2011) (“The European Court [of Hu-
man Rights] has consistently held that obligations under human rights treaties are active wherever gov-
ernments have ‘effective control’ over territories outside of their borders.”). 
 134. Cyprus, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶¶ 136, 150, 158, 175, 194, 254, 269-70, 296, 301, 311, 
324, 359. 
 135. See, e.g., id. ¶ 77 (“Having effective overall control over northern Cyprus, its responsibil-
ity cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must also be 
engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration . . . .”). 
 136. See, e.g., id. ¶ 76 (“It is not necessary to determine whether . . . Turkey actually exercises 
detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the ‘TRNC’.” (quoting Loizidou v. 
Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, ser. A, no. 310, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56 (1995)); id. ¶¶ 76-77 (using language 
indicative of a duty to protect when asserting that Turkey had to “secure” rights). 
 137. Id. ¶ 77 (“[T]he local administration . . . survives by virtue of Turkish military and other 
support.”). 
 138. Armed Activities is a contrary decision. Uganda seems to have had a similar relationship 
with rebel groups throughout the DRC. See Johan Pottier, Roadblock Ethnography: Negotiating Human-
itarian Access in Ituri, Eastern DR Congo, 1999–2004, 76 J. INT’L AFR. INST. 151, 157-59 (2006); Koen 
Vlassenroot & Timothy Raeymaekers, The Politics of Rebellion and Intervention in Ituri: The Emer-
gence of a New Political Complex?, 103 AFR. AFF. 358, 395 n.37, 397-410 (2004). However, the court 
assigned Uganda duties to protect only in the occupied areas. Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19). 
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in the Genocide Case, the ICJ highlighted Serbia’s support for the Bosnian 
Serbs who committed genocide.139 Serbia was responsible for not trying harder 
to prevent the genocide. In Ilaşcu v. Moldova, the European Court of Human 
Rights found that Russia had a similar relationship with Moldovan groups that 
violated rights in Moldova.140 According to the court, these groups “survive[d] 
by virtue of [Russia’s] military, economic, financial and political support.”141 
The court held Russia responsible.142 In Georgia v. Russia, Georgia claimed 
that Russia likewise supported groups that violated rights in Georgia.143 The 
ICJ dismissed Georgia’s case on jurisdictional grounds,144 but an order on pro-
visional measures directed the parties to “do all in their power to ensure that 
public authorities and public institutions under their control or influence do not 
engage in . . . racial discrimination.”145 The influence language hints at an ex-
traterritorial duty to protect. Even if Russia did not control the groups’ conduct 
so as to create an agency relationship and trigger a duty to respect, Russia 
should have satisfied a duty to protect. It should have pressured the groups not 
to violate rights. 
Comparable relationships can also exist between two states. Consider 
France’s extensive financial and military aid to the Rwandan regime that perpe-
trated genocide. Much of France’s aid predated the genocide,146 but some of it 
seems to have continued thereafter.147 To the extent that France aided the re-
gime “with a view to facilitating” genocide, it violated a duty to respect.148 But 
even if France did not itself participate in genocide, its substantial support 
might have triggered an extraterritorial duty to protect. Indeed, France was 
heavily criticized for not doing enough in Rwanda.149 And though France de-
 
 139. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 47, ¶¶ 434-38 (Feb. 26). 
 140. Ilaşcu v. Moldova, App. No. 48787/99, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179. 
 141. Id. ¶ 392. 
 142. Id. ¶¶ 393-94. As in Cyprus, the court’s logic in Ilaşcu is unclear. The court sometimes 
suggested that Russia was directly responsible for the abuses. See id. ¶ 393 (“[T]here [was] a continuous 
and uninterrupted link of responsibility on the part of the Russian Federation . . . .”). But the court also 
described Russia’s failings with language that is indicative of a duty to protect; Russia did not “attempt 
to put an end to the . . . situation.” Id. 
 143. Application of International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (Geor. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 13 (Oct. 15). 
 144. Application of International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (Geor. v. Russ.), Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.C.J. 70, ¶¶ 156-85 (Apr. 1). 
 145. Application of International Convention, Provisional Measures, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 149. 
 146. See DANIELA KROSLAK, THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 103-08, 114-
26, 135-39, 142-52 (2007); Mel McNulty, French Arms, War and Genocide in Rwanda, 33 CRIME L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 105, 108-15 (2000). 
 147. See ANDREW WALLIS, SILENT ACCOMPLICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FRANCE’S ROLE IN 
THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 114-18 (2006); McNulty, supra note 146, at 115-20. 
 148. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 149. REPUBLIQUE DU RWANDA, RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION NATIONALE INDÉPENDANTE 
CHARGÉE DE RASSEMBLER LES PREUVES MONTRANT L’IMPLICATION DE L’ETAT FRANÇAIS DANS LE 
GÉNOCIDE PERPÉTRÉ AU RWANDA EN 1994 (2007) (criticism from the new Rwandan government); 
ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, INT’L PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONALITIES, RWANDA: THE PREVENTABLE 
GENOCIDE ¶ 15.58 (2002) (criticism from the Organization of African Unity); Javier Alcalde & Caroline 
Bouchard, Human Security and Coherence within the EU: The Case of the 2006 UN Small Arms Con-
ference, 3 HAMBURG REV. SOC. SCI. 142, 163 (2008) (criticism from French civil society groups); DES 
FORGES, supra note 28, at 2, 6-7, 16-21, 175-76, 654-58, 688-91 (criticism from international human 
rights groups). 
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nied any legal responsibility, it accepted that it was “involved too much and for 
too long”150 and that it had a “moral duty . . . to stop the genocide.”151 
In short, certain kinds of relationships already seem to trigger extraterrito-
rial duties to protect. An outside state might have these duties if it exercises 
governmental authority over or substantially supports the perpetrators. The 
state would be responsible in these circumstances if it failed to exercise due dil-
igence to restrain the perpetrators. The diligence that is due would depend on 
the circumstances but might entail taking economic, diplomatic, or criminal 
measures against the perpetrators, or putting in place standards or processes 
that inhibit atrocities. A particular outside state would have to take those 
measures, even though other outside states would not, because the one already 
involved itself in the situation and entangled itself with the third party. 
3. Duty Not to Obstruct 
No matter whether a state must actively try to restrain a third-party perpe-
trator, it might be prohibited from obstructing the protective measures that third 
parties pursue. A duty not to obstruct is, at best, nascent in current practice and 
so lacks precise content. But in essence, such a duty would prohibit outside 
states from impeding measures to protect at-risk populations. Because states 
can reasonably disagree about which such measures are appropriate, a state that 
obstructs one measure might be responsible only if it does not pursue a mean-
ingful alternative, or only if it cannot justify its obstruction by a sufficiently 
weighty countervailing interest. 
A duty not to obstruct would build on two claims that have become quite 
prominent in the R2P literature: (1) the claim that states must cooperate to end 
violations of peremptory norms,152 and (2) the claim that the permanent mem-
bers of the U.N. Security Council must not use their veto in R2P cases.153 First, 
a duty not to obstruct overlaps with the claimed duty to cooperate because, by 
definition, an obstructing state fails to cooperate. Still, the duty not to obstruct 
would be less onerous. An outside state would not have to take affirmative 
steps to cooperate; it simply would have to avoid getting in the way. Moreover, 
whereas not cooperating is often passive and pervasive, obstructing usually in-
volves overt acts that can be identified and pinned on particular states.154 Se-
 
 150. Thomas Hirenee Atienga, France Denies Responsibility for Rwanda Genocide, IPS-INTER 
PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 16, 1998 (quoting French parliamentary report); see also ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, 
RAPPORT D’INFORMATION DÉPOSÉ EN APPLICATION DE L’ARTICLE 145 DU RÈGLEMENT PAR LA MISSION 
D’INFORMATION DE LA COMMISSION DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES FORCES ARMÉES ET DE LA 
COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES, SUR LES OPÉRATIONS MILITARIES MENÉES PAR LA FRANCE, 
D’AUTRES PAYS ET I’ONU AU RWANDA ENTRE 1990 ET 1994 [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, INFORMATIONAL 
REPORT FILED UNDER ARTICLE 145 OF THE RULES BY THE FACT-FINDING MISSION OF THE COMMISSION 
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ARMED FORCES AND THE COMMISSION ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON 
MILITARY OPERATIONS BY FRANCE, OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE U.N. IN RWANDA BETWEEN 1990-
1994] (1998) (Fr.) (parliamentary report). 
 151. See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 296 (1995) (quoting a report on Prime Minis-
ter Edouard Balladur’s July 12, 1994, speech to the United Nations). 
 152. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, art. 41, § 1. 
 153. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 154. Cf. Marcus G. Singer, Negative and Positive Duties, 15 PHIL. Q. 97, 103 (1965) 
(“[P]ositive duties, when they have no corresponding or equivalent negative duties, are relatively less 
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cond, a duty not to obstruct overlaps with the claimed duty not to veto. Using 
the veto might be obstructive; it might prevent the Council from acting to pro-
tect an at-risk population.155 Yet the veto is only one of many ways in which 
states can act obstructively. 
The early stages of the recent crisis in Syria illustrate these points. In the 
U.N. Security Council, China and Russia repeatedly vetoed or threatened to ve-
to resolutions that would have put pressure on the Assad regime.156 This con-
duct might be evidence of obstruction but is not dispositive. States could rea-
sonably disagree about what to do in Syria and, therefore, about the content of 
particular Security Council resolutions. Indeed, China and Russia used their ve-
toes on some Syria resolutions even as they allowed others to pass.157 These 
two states also acquiesced in the Council’s various presidential158 and press159 
statements on Syria.160 
Looking outside the Council reveals a broader pattern of obstructionism. 
China and Russia were consistently among a handful of states in the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly161 and Human Rights Council162 that voted against resolutions 
 
determinate than negative duties.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Arbour, supra note 30, at 453 (arguing for restricting the use of the veto on the 
ground that the permanent members should not “inhibit[] other States from discharging their duty to 
protect when those States are willing and able to discharge their obligations”). 
 156. See U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6810th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810 (July 19, 2012) (record of 
Council meeting at which Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution); S.C. Draft Res. 2012/538, U.N. 
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(Oct. 4, 2011) (text of vetoed resolution). 
 157. S.C. Res. 2043, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (Apr. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2042, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2042 (Apr. 14, 2012). 
 158. S.C. Pres. Statement 2012/10, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2012/10 (Apr. 5, 2012); S.C. Pres. 
Statement 2012/6, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2012/6 (Mar. 21, 2012); S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/16, U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2011/16 (Aug. 3, 2011). 
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U.N. Press Release SC/10800 (Oct. 24, 2012); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press 
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condemning the Assad regime. These two states also declined to participate in 
multilateral meetings that sought to pressure Assad either to step down or to 
find a political solution to the crisis.163 Further, although China and Russia 
largely synchronized their positions in multilateral arenas, Russia did more of 
the dirty work.164 Russia’s early support for Assad undermined efforts to iso-
late him and lessened the likelihood that his regime would buckle under outside 
pressure.165 Moreover, Russia continued to ship military equipment to the re-
gime after its atrocities were apparent.166 This broader pattern of behavior sug-
gests that China might have acted obstructively and that Russia very likely did. 
The Syria case is also illustrative because it suggests that a duty not to 
obstruct might be developing informally. States and other actors persistently 
 
A/HRC/RES/19/22 (Apr. 10, 2012) (vote of 41-3-2); Human Rights Council Res. 19/1, The Escalating 
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partment of the Russian Foreign Ministry, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FED’N (Apr. 
14, 2011), http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a 7b43256999005bcbb3/cc03ab3b7bfc 
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pressured Russia167 and, to a lesser extent, China168 to stop obstructing inter-
national action in Syria. This pressure arguably yielded modest results. Some 
have speculated that, in December 2011, Russia proposed a Security Council 
resolution because “human rights organizations . . . made Russia seem like a 
partner in the Syrian regime’s crimes.”169 Yet no matter whether Russia or 
China altered its behavior, the fact that other actors applied this pressure sug-
gests that they understood the two states—and especially Russia—to be acting 
reprehensibly. Further, the fact that these other actors pressured Russia and 
China, but not states that neither obstructed nor cooperated in any international 
action, demonstrates that a duty not to obstruct might gain traction even if a du-
ty to cooperate cannot. 
4.  Duty to Assist 
Finally, outside states might have to help foster conditions that are inhos-
pitable to atrocities. The nature of this assistance can vary, from transferring 
material resources, to training local actors, to rebuilding domestic institutions. 
Such assistance is similar in kind to that which satisfies human rights duties to 
fulfill. The R2P duty would differ from a duty to fulfill, however, because the 
R2P duty would focus on realizing negative, not positive, liberties. The goal 
would be to shield people from third-party harms by reducing the risk of atroci-
ties breaking out. Still, the hurdles that have confronted extraterritorial duties to 
fulfill would almost certainly confront this R2P duty, as well. 
The claim that states must give foreign assistance to help people abroad 
has circulated for decades, usually in the context of pressuring developed states 
to alleviate severe poverty in developing states. The claim arguably finds sup-
port in the text of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), which requires states to “take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation,” to help realize rights.170 
The body that monitors the ICESCR interprets that text to mean that “economi-
cally developed States parties have a special responsibility and interest to assist 
the poorer developing States” by providing “resources, financial and technical 
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assistance, and . . . aid when required.”171 Other U.N. organs have advanced a 
similar claim.172 Moreover, U.N. documents repeatedly urge developed coun-
tries to commit 0.7 percent of their gross domestic products to development 
aid173—a target that has been reinforced in recent years by the U.N. Millennium 
Development Goals, a high-profile effort to address severe poverty.174 
Yet the claim that developed states must give human rights or develop-
ment aid is still of questionable authority and has not been especially effective 
in practice.175 The ICJ recognized in its Wall opinion that the ICESCR—which 
includes duties to respect and protect but is driven by duties to fulfill—is “es-
sentially territorial.”176 Further, developed states have consistently resisted the 
idea that they are obligated to give foreign assistance.177 Thus, although the 
Millennium Development Goals have received sustained and high-level atten-
tion, these goals do not recognize or create binding obligations for developed 
states.178 And although many states endorse the 0.7 percent figure discursively, 
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few have actually achieved that goal.179 
Claims relating to foreign assistance have been more successful in inter-
national environmental and trade law than they have been in human rights law. 
Some environmental treaties require developed states to transfer resources to 
developing states.180 Similarly, international trade law encourages developed 
states to give developing states technical assistance on implementing or adapt-
ing to trade law.181 These claims might be more effective than comparable 
claims in human rights law for various reasons. First, no single state is expected 
to care for the global environment or manage transnational trade. In contrast, 
each state generally is expected to provide for its own population.182 Second, 
the extent to which foreign aid helps realize rights in recipient states is still hot-
ly contested.183 Third, human rights and development aid raise unique legiti-
macy concerns. Addressing the structural causes of poverty means reforming 
governmental institutions, establishing the rule of law, and targeting discrimi-
natory cultural practices. This work strikes at the heart of a society’s political, 
economic, and social systems, and is deeply intrusive if it comes from external 
forces. Unsurprisingly, then, recipient states tend to bristle at restrictions on 
their aid that seem to intrude too heavily on their internal affairs.184 
Aid for R2P looks a lot like human rights and development aid. For ex-
ample, the U.N. Secretary General has proposed using R2P aid to educate local 
actors about human rights, build domestic institutions, redress severe poverty, 
and enhance the positions of women and disadvantaged minorities.185 These 
proposals are unlikely to gain legal traction simply by linking them to R2P. On 
the contrary, the experience with the Millennium Development Goals demon-
strates that developed states resist the claim that such assistance is obligatory 
even when the underlying policy objectives have broad and high-level support. 
The hurdles to establishing an R2P duty to assist are substantial. 
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For this duty to have any prospect of success, it must identify the grounds 
for holding specific tightfisted states responsible.186 Because an R2P duty to 
assist would entail redistributing wealth or expertise, it might account for 
states’ positive capacities in ways that other R2P duties do not. Still, positive 
capacity is an insufficient basis for assigning responsibility. In any given case, 
many outside states that have the capacity to give will not. Responsibility 
should instead be grounded in a state’s own conduct or relationships.187 For 
example, an outside state might be responsible for not helping a population if 
the state contributed to the risk of atrocities breaking out,188 or if the state has a 
unique relationship with the population, such as one rooted in a colonial past. 
The point is that grounding responsibility in the state’s conduct or relationships 
is consistent with the law’s theoretical foundations and thus a way to develop 
the law going forward. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has proposed a new vision for R2P and presented a rudimen-
tary framework for implementing that vision. I have argued that R2P should not 
posit an all-encompassing duty that falls, at once, on the entire international 
community. R2P should instead posit a bundle of more discrete duties, and re-
sponsibility for each duty should attach to specific outside states at a time. This 
latter vision is appealing because it is anchored in existing international law and 
follows the law’s current trajectory. As such, this vision has both descriptive 
and predictive value. It explains how international law already supports R2P 
and how international law might realistically develop to continue supporting 
R2P going forward. 
Whether international law will actually develop along these lines is an-
other question. States are highly unlikely to ratify a new treaty on R2P or to ex-
pand the jurisdiction of courts or other bodies that might develop and enforce 
new R2P duties. In the near term, any further prescription and enforcement on 
R2P is likely to occur informally—as states, international organizations, and 
civil society groups craft new norms on R2P and put pressure on states that de-
viate from those norms. These disparate actors might work together to articu-
late a set of non-binding norms on R2P. They might incorporate their preferred 
norms into official documents, like the U.N. Secretary General’s reports on 
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R2P. And they might apply these norms to sanction particular outside states. 
The informality of that process presents both an opportunity and a chal-
lenge for R2P. The opportunity is that global actors who are committed to R2P 
can apply and enforce their preferred duties, even absent a clear consensus on 
what the duties require or whether the duties qualify as law. In other words, 
they can use my framework to try to push the law in their preferred direction. 
This is also R2P’s challenge. Operative R2P duties will not develop unless the 
commitment to them is sufficiently broad and deep that enough global actors 
decide either to satisfy the duties voluntarily or to enforce the duties against 
deviant states.189 That level of commitment might not exist. But if it does—and 
there is some reason for optimism190—R2P should offer a vision that resonates 
with different actors and can actually gain legal traction. 
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